The Role of AI-Driven Predictive Analytics in COIN/CT Operations of Burkina Faso
- Get link
- X
- Other Apps
Author: India Bill Christopher Arputharaj is a Research Scholar affiliated with the Department of Strategic Technologies, School of National Security Studies, at the Central University of Gujarat, Vadodara Campus, Gujarat, India. His academic work is situated within the broader field of strategic technologies and national security studies. For all correspondence regarding this research, he can be reached at christopher240721001@cug.ac.in. Publisher: Fulcrum Analytics.
Backdrop: Threat Landscape in the Sahel Region:
The Sahelian theatre of operations, focusing on Burkina Faso, necessitates a re-examination of Counter-Insurgency (COIN) and Counter-Terrorism (CT) tactics in light of the dynamic nature of asymmetric warfare. The crisis traces back to the 2011 downfall of Libyan state control, which had caused a flood of sophisticated weapons and seasoned combatants into the Sahel region and hence encouraged insurgencies in northern Mali as well as supporting organisations like Jama’at Nusrat al-Islamwal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS).[i] By 2015, this instability had spilt over into Burkina Faso, in the form of targeted violence in Ouagadougou to illustrate the vulnerabilities of the state, stunt the economy and tourism in particular and damage national morale. The conflict has escalated to a generalised rural insurgency, involving the Burkinabe government and its supporters in a long-term fight in which insurgents have control over the timing and tactics of engagements. This escalation from a regional problem to a serious domestic insurgency highlights the transnational and fluid threat these groups represent, regularly outmanoeuvring traditional military action and exposing deep vulnerabilities in intelligence and operational planning.[ii] The insurgents take advantage of porous borders for prolonged operational effectiveness, creating a cycle of tactical manoeuvres that do not produce significant strategic dividends. Such a context underscores the imperative for breakthrough technological solutions and an urgent re-examination of operational models to reverse the adversary’s continued gains.[iii]
The Operational Environment: Asymmetric Challenges in African COIN/CT:
The following establishes the strategic challenges for traditional military forces in Burkina Faso, which are compounded by an operational environment that aims to degrade their performance. The war was presented as asymmetric warfare, where insurgents used geographic advantages such as ungoverned territory and open borders with Mali and Niger for conducting strategic operations. They employed hybrid warfare strategies of conventional ambushes, attacks on fixed military targets, and terrorist attacks on civilians, hindering counterattacks by the military. These are compounded by scarce resources and intelligence capabilities, which make it challenging for military forces to exercise control and legitimacy as insurgent operations seek to strip the state's security provision of public confidence.[iv] A key issue is the intelligence shortfall that prevents decision-making and constrains commanders from forestalling insurgent movements, resulting in tactical surprise. The absence of integration within predictive intelligence blocks end-to-end Pattern-of-Life (POL) analysis and the establishment of a proven Common Operational Picture (COP), leading to enormous collateral damage that is exploited by insurgents for propaganda. It compromises essential Human Intelligence (HUMINT) in counterinsurgency operations, which leads to a disconnect between governments and people that the insurgents exploit. Existing reactive approaches, though providing temporary relief from short-term threats, inadvertently support insurgent recruitment and amplify grievances. Overcoming this paradox requires the creation of new capabilities aimed not only at gathering data but at concentrating foresight to end the reactive engagement cycle.[v]
Fig.
1: Heatmap Analysis of African Terror Incidents (1946 – 2024)
Data
Source: UCDP, Shapefile | QGIS 3.44.3, 2025 | Author
MAP NOT TO SCALE | FOR ILLUSTRATION PURPOSES ONLY
AI-Driven Predictive Analytics: Core Capabilities for the Modern Battlespace:
To enhance operational clarity in intelligence, the employment of AI-driven technologies is crucial, transitioning from descriptive to prescriptive insights through advanced machine learning techniques that analyse diverse datasets for hidden patterns.[vi] Utilising spatio-temporal pattern analysis via deep learning models like TabNet (Tabular Deep Neural Network Architecture), EBO (Effects-Based Operations) facilitates the exploration of multi-dimensional data, including historical attack logs, Signal Intelligence (SIGINT), Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) reports. This methodology unmasks non-linear relationships, allowing for the forecast of likely hotspots and cyclical patterns of attack, generating probabilistic terrain maps predicting insurgent activity, thus upgrading intelligence from rudimentary reporting to proactive predictive analysis. Additionally, optimised ensemble classifiers, utilising Particle Swarm Optimisation (PSO), Random Forest, and Xtreme Gradient Boosting (XGBoost) algorithms, improve attack type classification accuracy, essential for determining possible weaponry, targets, and tactics.[vii] The unification of communication data in a Social Network Analysis (SNA) paradigm enables the identification of attackers and leading actors in logistics, finance, and propaganda, with High-Value Targets (HVTs) as the priority and shifting operational tactics from attritional to targeted network disruption. Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) and Gradient Boosting regression models provide predictive logistics support needed for the anticipation of Mass Casualty Incidents (MCI).[viii] These models analyse anticipated attack behavior to provide estimations of likely casualties, facilitate strategic preposition of medical equipment, determination of aeromedical evacuation corridors, and the deployment of blood supplies to minimise the overall impact of attacks. The Synthetic Minority Over-Sampling Technique (SMOTE) also accounts for imbalances in data within areas of conflict, emphasising important but infrequent events despite their rarity over less effective frequent occurrences. Consequently, this integration of technology converts raw data into usable battlefield intelligence, requiring the creation of a new warfighting doctrine to implement effectively.[ix]
Fig
2: Taxonomy of AI Techniques in Counter-Terrorism
Source: Syllaidopoulos,
I., Ntalianis, K. S., & Salmon, I. (2025). A Comprehensive Survey on AI in
Counter-Terrorism and Cybersecurity: Challenges and Ethical Dimensions. IEEE
Access, 13, 91740–91764. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2025.3572348
Applications in COIN/CT Operations:
The integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) of the military significantly enhances operational effectiveness by improving the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop.[x] Leveraging an AI stack as part of the Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE), the system continually processes real-time and historical information to generate a Dynamic Common Operational Picture (DCOP).[xi] This DCOP facilitates nimble evaluations of the battlespace to provide commanders with the ability to detect insurgent operations, forecast weapon caches, and assess infiltration corridors, thus facilitating a focus on particular missions rather than large-scale Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance operations. The CONOPS also enables Precision Targeting and Effects-Based Operations by using AI to detect High-Value Targets (HVTs) and key nodes, which enable the accurate strikes that can disrupt insurgent supply chains, for instance, by targeting logistical support staff rather than fighting many firefighters. It can also assess non-kinetic measures like psychological operations and cyber actions, thereby creating multi-domain challenges for adversaries.[xii] Predictive Force Protection is improved through AI-generated threat assessments that support proactive risk management for patrol routes and infrastructure, leading to decreased casualties and enhanced operational efficiency. The system also enhances Information Operations (IO) by analysing media sentiment and social network trends, helping to counter misinformation and promote narratives that strengthen state legitimacy.[xiii] However, the deployment of this CONOPS introduces new digital vulnerabilities and strategic risks, necessitating careful strategy formulation for effective mapping and mitigation to maintain operational security.
Challenges, Critical Limitations, and Strategic Risks:
In AI-guided military operations, several weaknesses and strategic issues arise that are similar to those associated with conventional warfare. Central to this is the “garbage in, garbage out” phenomenon, which underscores data quality and consolidation as crucial to successful predictive analytics.[xiv] Some of the challenges include disparate reporting, biased historical data, and poor standardised data-sharing among G5 Sahel partners, all of which compromise algorithm training and escalate the threat of mission failures. Poor data inputs can lead to mistaken tactical advice, potentially resulting in incidents like friendly fire or civilian harm.[xv][xvi] Algorithm bias is a significant concern; AI models trained on data from specific ethnic areas, such as those populated by the Fulani, risk erroneously associating that ethnicity with insurgency, thereby threatening operational decisions and potentially harming community relations.[xvii] Moreover, adversaries may employ tactics such as data poisoning and misinformation to undermine predictive accuracy, creating a “fog of data” in combat situations, which necessitates heightened vigilance regarding information superiority. The lack of clear ethical and legal frameworks regarding the role of AI in deadly actions makes compliance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) more difficult, especially regarding responsibility for AI-caused deaths.[xviii] The current debate addresses whether the responsibility should rest with operators, developers, or commanders. Ineffectiveness of Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) systems and unclear Rules of Engagement (ROE) intensify ethical dilemmas, jeopardising operational efficiency and legal legitimacy.[xix] Future strategies must strive for careful equilibrium between embracing technological innovation and maintaining rigorous ethical and technical protections to prevent catastrophic outcomes.
Conclusion:
Military tactics in Burkina Faso's war need to go beyond conventional counter-insurgency by leveraging Artificial Intelligence (AI) for predictive analytics, from reactive to proactive. A human-focused decision support system is needed for accurate, timely results for complex operations. Having a Joint Inter-Agency AI Fusion Cell (JIAFC) will focus on AI and machine learning endeavours, aided by intelligence officers and data scientists. It focuses on Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) procedures for human monitoring of all kinetic activities to maintain adherence to International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and ethics. It is important to address algorithmic bias with an inclusive Bias Testing and Mitigation Program that comprises audits and methods such as the synthetic minority over-sampling technique (SMOTE). Increased cooperation towards data standardisation between ECOWAS and G5 Sahel countries is crucial for safe data sharing and enhanced predictive powers, ultimately campaigning for responsible AI integration in Counter-Insurgency and Counter-Terrorism (COIN/CT) operations.
[i] Lounnas, D. (2018). The Libyan Security Continuum: The Impact of the Libyan Crisis on the North African/Sahelian Regional System. WORKING PAPERS, 15. https://www.cidob.org/sites/default/files/2025 03/MENARA_Working%20paper_15_18.pdf?
[ii] Studies, the A. C. for S. (2025, August 26). A Growing Divergence of Security Narratives in Burkina Faso. Africa Center. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/security-narratives-burkina-faso/
[iii] Okpaleke, F. N., Nwosu, B. U., Okoli, C. R., & Olumba, E. E. (2023, June 11). Full article: The case for drones in counter-insurgency operations in West African Sahel. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10246029.2023.2217158
[iv] OECD & Sahel and West Africa Club. (2020). The Geography of Conflict in North and West Africa. OECD. https://doi.org/10.1787/02181039-en
[v] Caudle, D. (2010). Decision-Making Uncertainty and the Use of Force in Cyberspace: A Phenomenological Study of Military Officers. 483. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235202490_Decision-Making_Uncertainty_and_the_Use_of_Force_in_Cyberspace_A_Phenomenological_Study_of_Military_Officers
[vi] Shao, Z., Qian, T., Sun, T., Wang, F., & Xu, Y. (2025). Spatial-temporal large models: A super hub linking multiple scientific areas with artificial intelligence. The Innovation, 6(2), 100763. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.xinn.2024.100763
[vii] Narinder, V., Neerendra, K., Gourav, K., & Kuljeet, S. (2025, August 12). A hybrid ensemble framework with particle swarm optimization for network anomaly detection | Discover Applied Sciences. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s42452-025-07419-x
[viii] Mayur, P. (2024, February 29). The Ethics of AI Addressing Bias, Privacy, and Accountability in Machine Learning. https://www.cloudthat.com/resources/blog/the-ethics-of-ai-addressing-bias-privacy-and-accountability-in-machine-learning
[ix] Elreedy, D., Atiya, A., & Kamalov, F. (2023). A theoretical distribution analysis of synthetic minority oversampling technique (SMOTE) for imbalanced learning. Machine Learning, 113. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10994-022-06296-4
[x] Tim, S. (2024, June 21). AI and the OODA loop: How AI enhances strategic decisions for today’s warfighters—Military Embedded Systems. https://militaryembedded.com/ai/big-data/ai-and-the-ooda-loop-how-ai-enhances-strategic-decisions-for-todays-warfighters
[xi] Abbas, S., & Garg, A. (2024). AIOps in DevOps: Leveraging Artificial Intelligence for Operations and Monitoring (p. 70). https://doi.org/10.1109/ICSADL61749.2024.00016
[xii] AI Targeting Systems in Defense: Smarter Surveillance 2025. (2025, July 25). https://www.defence-industries.com/articles/how-ai-driven-targeting-systems-are-enhancing-multi-domain
[xiii] Blessing, M. (2025, July 25). AI Targeting Systems in Defense: Smarter Surveillance 2025. https://www.defence-industries.com/articles/how-ai-driven-targeting-systems-are-enhancing-multi-domain
[xiv] Williams, J. (2025, July 9). Military AI: Operational dangers and the regulatory void - Diplo. https://www.diplomacy.edu/blog/why-military-ai-needs-urgent-regulation/
[xv] Integration for Impact: INTERPOL and the G5 Sahel Joint Task Force – Police Component. (n.d.). Interpol. Retrieved October 19, 2025, from https://www.interpol.int/es/Delitos/Terrorismo/Proyectos-de-lucha-contra-el-terrorismo/G5-Sahel
[xvi] Verma, U. (2024, January 5). Algorithmic Bias: What It Is and Why It Matters. Built In. https://builtin.com/data-science/auditing-algorithms-data-science-bias
[xvii] Jonker, A., & Rogers, J. (n.d.). What Is Algorithmic Bias? | IBM. IBM. Retrieved October 19, 2025, from https://www.ibm.com/think/topics/algorithmic-bias
[xviii] Minhas, A. (2025, April 18). The Legal Framework Governing Artificial Intelligence in Warfare: Challenges and Opportunities. Record Of Law. https://recordoflaw.in/the-legal-framework-governing-artificial-intelligence-in-warfare-challenges-and-opportunities/
[xix] Henderson, D. (2024,
April 16). Is Human-in-the-loop the ultimate AI control? Spoiler alert, it
isn’t. https://www.aligne.ai/blog-posts/is-human-in-the-loop-the-ultimate-ai-control-spoiler-alert-it-isnt
- Get link
- X
- Other Apps
Comments
Post a Comment