It's not just M23: CODECO and ISCAP Persist in Eastern DRC

Authored by: Cara Rau; Political and intelligence analyst focussed on African Jihadism and political violence. 

Bottom Line Up Front

In addition to recent gains by the March 23 Movement (M23) in North and South Kivu Provinces of DRC, the Cooperative for the Development of the Congo (CODECO) and Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) continue to terrorise communities of the Ituri and North-Kivu Provinces. On 10 February 2025, the Cooperative for the Development of the Congo (CODECO) killed at least 51 civilians in an attack on the Djaiba group of villages in Ituri Province after an attack the night before on a camp for internally displaced people (IDPs). A list allegedly of the names of the 51 victims circulated on social media. Further, multiple sources including the Catholic Herold, Aid to the Church in Need, and Benin Web TV, among others reported the killing of at least 70 Christians whose bodies were found in a church in Kasanga, North-Kivu Province on 15 February. The sources report that, according to witnesses, many of the victims had been beheaded. Among the victims were women, children, and the elderly and news sources report that the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an armed group that has pledged allegiance to ISCAP, was responsible for the massacre. 

Additionally, ISCAP claimed on 14 February to have carried out an attack against the Christian village of Mabuya, North-Kivu Province on 12 February allegedly capturing 19 Christians and seizing their property. ISCAP has claimed other attacks on Christians in Ituri and North-Kivu this year. Though it is difficult to make an exact calculation of the amount of Christians killed by ISCAP so far this year, it should be noted that Barnabas Aid, an international, interdenominational Christian aid agency that supports Christians who face discrimination or persecution as a consequence of their faith reported on 17 February that at least 89 Christians have been killed by ISCAP in North-Eastern DRC in the past month. ISCAP also targets defence force personnel and the group claimed on 18 February to have killed 8 soldiers during an attack on an army barracks in Lubero on 17 February. 

North-Kivu, South-Kivu and Ituri Provinces, DRC

Ethnic and Farmer-Herder Rivalries

CODECO is a predominantly ethnic Lendu armed group, sometimes called a militia, with a history of attacking civilians in IDP camps. CODECO also has a record of targeting the Hema ethnic community and the conflict between these two groups goes back to historical rivalries from when the groups fought each other during the 1999-2003 war. Notably, young Hema members have organised into self-defence groups and set up roadblocks in Ituri Province, which could mean that we see clashes between Hema and Lendu groups in the future. It also has to be noted that the Hema are largely herders and the Lendu are largely farmers, highlighting the farmer-herder aspect of this conflict. 

CODECO commanders walk through Linga village, Ituri Province on 13 January 2022. Source: The East African

Wazalendos 

The situation in Eastern DRC is highly complex and the point of this blog is not to list all the actors involved in the conflict. However, we take a moment here to briefly talk about the role of the Wazalendos. The Wazalendos are an irregular group of fighters sometimes called a militia and aligned with the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), the Congolese armed forces. Though they are known for fighting against M23, there are continued reports that armed groups in both North and South-Kivu have rebranded themselves as Wazalendo, even when not part of the coalition fighting the M23. This is a notable phenomenon and it highlights the complex nature of warfare in contexts where numerous actors with different ambitions operate under the same banner. It should also be noted that according to a 2024 report by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, FARDC and its proxies have perpetrated extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrests and detentions. This speaks to the risks of using militias and/or self-defence groups in the armed forces. 

Often, civilians bare the brunt of the violence between government-allied militias and their enemies. On 20 February, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reported that since early January, the area in and around Masisi town in southern North-Kivu Province has been fought over almost daily by Wazalendo fighters and M23. MSF said that the clashes have led to an influx of wounded – most of them civilians – at Masisi general referral hospital, which is supported by MSF, while thousands of people have sought refuge at the MSF base and the hospital compound.  

A Forgotten War

It is striking that even in the face of grave human rights abuses that are committed in Eastern DRC, the conflict receives relatively little international attention compared to theatres in the Middle East and Eastern Europe which receive almost year-round media coverage and social media attention. This could be for a variety of reasons and this is not to say that any one conflict deserves more media coverage than any other; it is simply noticeable that despite the dire situation in DRC, the world seems to give it less attention than it does to Ukraine and Gaza. It brings to mind a similar phenomenon where the war in Sudan garners much less attention on social media and from online activists than it should be getting considering the scale of destruction and suffering. However, it is good to know that there is at least some attention being paid to Sub-Saharan African conflicts  despite having historically been ignored to an extent. Perhaps this will improve as time goes on. 

Looking Forward

Though this piece does not discuss or even list all the actors involved in the region, it is clear from the presence of  M23, ISCAP, CODECO, and the Wazalendos that Eastern DRC continues to see high levels of violence from multiple actors with different goals. The situation is one of the most complex and fluid on the continent in my opinion and it is likely to continue evolving. Discussions and policy-making at international level should aim to address all (or most) of the most pressing issues that have led the situation to the way that it currently stands such as historical ethnic conflict, the effects of climate change on farmer-herder conflict, illicit trade in extractives,  organized crime, government corruption, and militia activity, to name a few. It would also likely improve the situation if more media and social media attention was given to the conflict so that more people and aid groups can be aware of the ongoing humanitarian crises in Eastern DRC.