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The withdrawal of SADC troops from the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) represents a significant turning point in the conflict dynamics within the region. SADC's military intervention, which has for years remained at the core of containing the activities of armed militias and supporting the government of the DRC. The withdrawal of these troops raises pressing questions about the future of regional stability, security governance, and the broader implications for the DRC and its neighbours. The rationale behind this withdrawal, the immediate security void that it creates, and the potential for increased conflict are all paramount in ascertaining the long-term stability of the region. The SADC and EAC Foreign Ministers met yesterday for a Joint EAC-SADC Ministerial Meeting in Harare, Zimbabwe amid increased tensions in the wake of the SADC's recent decision to pull out its troops from the war-torn area on a "phased withdrawal" highlights the imperative of diplomatic action to return peace and security.
Background of SADC's Involvement in Eastern Congo
SADC's military intervention in the DRC is premised on the regional bloc's commitment to collective security as enshrined in the Mutual Defence Pact of 2003. The intervention was necessitated primarily by the increasing brutality and prevalence of several armed groups, including the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the M23 rebel movement. SADC has, since 2013, deployed troops under the auspices of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) mandate, in collaboration with the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). In addition to the Congolese army, there have been Burundian troops deployed under a bilateral military agreement with the DRC; Ugandan troops fighting alongside the Congolese army against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF); French and Romanian mercenaries in the employ of the Congolese government; an ad hoc collection of Congolese armed militias opportunistically allied with Kinshasa against the M23; Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF) clandestinely supporting the M23; and UN peacekeepers deployed with the MONUSCO. They have waged counter-insurgency operations and supported the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) in the maintenance of territorial integrity and civilian protection. However, with the recent geopolitical realignments and domestic pressures within member states, there has been a drawing down from the region. It is into this hypermilitarised environment that SADC has deployed its own regional force: the SADC Mission in the DRC, comprising South African, Tanzanian, and Malawian troops. The SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) has been developing its force very slowly since December 2023, and it is supposed to have a total strength of 4,800 troops when fully deployed.
SADC first announced its intentions to deploy troops to the DRC in May 2023. Another regional force – the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF), which consists of troops from Kenya, South Sudan, Uganda, and Burundi – had by then been on the ground in eastern DRC for six months. While Kinshasa had approved the EACRF deployment, the Congolese government and the EAC soon differed over the mandate of the force. Kinshasa argued that EACRF had a robust mandate to track down and forcibly disarm the M23 rebels, while EACRF argued that it was deployed to stabilize the area and assist in holding a ceasefire – not actively pursue the rebels. As the war unfolded, Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi started to look elsewhere for allies who would support him in his battle with the M23 and Rwanda; enter South Africa and SADC. It is not clear what motivated SADC and South Africa specifically to get involved in a mission whose expense its own estimates placed at $500 million annually. South African government officials explain that the SADC Mutual Defense Pact obligates SADC to rush to the rescue of a member nation when it is invaded by an external military attack. Nevertheless, given the costs involved, it is hard to believe that this is the only motivation. The South African government has already been faulted for deciding to spend $100 million to fund the deployment, at a time when the country is plagued by several serious domestic crises.
Apart from having to deal with serious operational challenges, the deployment has also incurred the ire of Rwandan president, Paul Kagame. South Africa and Rwanda have traditionally had poor relations, as Kigali sent hit squads to South Africa to assassinate political dissidents whom South Africa had granted political asylum. In an interview with the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) in early April, Kagame blamed South Africa for not informing Rwanda that it was going to deploy to the Eastern DRC. Earlier, Rwanda had addressed letters to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the African Union Peace and Security Council (AU-PSC) condemning the deployment of SAMIDRC as aggression and asking the two bodies not to authorize the mission. Rwanda's diplomatic endeavors were fruitless, nevertheless, and both the UN and the AU have endorsed SAMIDRC, paving the way for the mission to access international funding.
Motivations for SADC's Withdrawal of Forces
Several reasons account for the pullout of SADC's forces. First, budgetary constraints and the cost of open-ended military intervention have placed significant burdens on contributing countries, especially in the context of domestic economic difficulties. Second, there is growing fatigue on the part of SADC member states, most of which view the conflict in the DRC as a drain on resources without corresponding political or security returns. In addition, doubts over the efficacy of military reactions in addressing the root causes of the conflict - such as governance deficits, resource competition, and ethnic tensions - have prompted a reconsideration of SADC's role. There are also internal political reasons for some member states, where maintaining popular support for foreign military deployments has become increasingly difficult. Announcing the move, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa declared that the "situation is precarious, but the peace as it is now is holding". SADC leaders have stated that although the troops would be withdrawn from the DRC, the bloc would nonetheless "support interventions aimed at bringing lasting peace".
At the political level, SADC's involvement through the SAMIDRC was meant to stabilize the Eastern DRC, shore up the government of the Republic, and prevent overspill of fighting into other states. However, the persistent instability there and the small progress made toward lasting peace have increased political weariness.
Member states may view deeper involvement as politically costly, particularly when domestic opinion sets against further military intervention. For example, domestic opposition to troop deployment abroad may force governments to trade-off between national security interests and regional commitments. The withdrawal may also be an expression of dissatisfaction with the way the DRC government is managing the conflict, particularly its engagement with external actors like the EAC force, which some SADC members view as encroaching on their sphere of influence.
In addition, the perceived lack of cooperation on the part of SADC and the MONUSCO renders joint operations challenging. Intelligence reports indicate that SADC may see limited strategic value in maintaining a costly presence when coordination with international partners remains ad hoc and political gains prove elusive.
It is expensive to maintain an international military deployment, and SAMIDRC's economic cost has become a compelling force for withdrawal. SADC nations are faced with local economic issues, including rising levels of indebtedness, inflation, and post-pandemic economic revival. For instance, key contributors like South Africa are confronted with economic uncertainty and mounting demand for domestic investment in social welfare and infrastructure. Prolonged military involvement in the DRC diverts resources from these types of national priorities. Intelligence reports suggest that without considerable external funding - whether from the AU or international partners - SADC member states are not prepared to continue the financial investment required for a successful long-term military presence.
Strategically, the withdrawal reflects the broader refocusing of SADC's security agenda. Some members are redirecting their focus towards more immediate security challenges, including internal insurgencies, transnational crime, and maritime threats. Mozambique's ongoing insurgency in Cabo Delgado, for example, requires long-term military commitment and intelligence capacity. South Africa's increasing focus on national crime and border management also limits its ability to project power abroad. By reducing its presence in the DRC, SADC members can divert military and intelligence assets to these pressing national and regional imperatives.
Moreover, SADC's withdrawal signifies a transition to rebalance its intervention model. Rather than committing itself to open-ended territorial commitments, there is growing interest in hybrid models that focus on intelligence-sharing, rapid-reaction forces, and political mediation rather than large-scale, long-term military engagement. Operational issues have also guided the withdrawal decision. Difficult terrain in Eastern DRC and the complexity of armed groups, including the M23 rebels, have made the battlefield dynamic and unstable. In addition to this, sources confirm that SADC forces have been faced with logistical challenges, including maintaining supply lines and troop mobility.
Limited intelligence capability and difficulties in coordinating with local forces have oftentimes frustrated effective operations. The absence of actionable, real-time intelligence has weakened SADC's ability to neutralize threats and assert territorial control. This kind of operational fatigue, along with rising casualties and low morale among troops, has reinforced the perception that the mission is unsustainable without a plausible means of winning.
Finally, but not least, external geopolitical pressure is a critical variable determining SADC's exit strategy. Intelligence briefs indicate rising tensions between the SADC and the EAC over competing strategies on the DRC conflict. The DRC's simultaneous wooing of both blocs has managed to bring about a scenario where SADC's strategic influence is diluted. International actors, including China, the European Union, and the United States, are also recalibrating their positions on the DRC. Some SADC states may perceive an opportunity to withdraw while other regional and global actors assume the peacekeeping responsibility. Additionally, the African Union's pressure to harmonize regional interventions has further complicated SADC's unilateral initiative.
Security Vacuum and Escalation of Violence
The most immediate consequence of SADC's withdrawal is the opportunity it leaves for armed groups to expand their operations. The Eastern DRC has been plagued for years by over 120 active non-state armed groups, the most active and deadly being the M23 and ADF. Both have proven to be resilient and adaptive, exploiting governance vacuums and ineffective military intervention to entrench themselves.
The M23, which has historically had external support and illegal revenue from mineral-rich areas, can escalate its activities in key provinces like North Kivu and Ituri. Military intelligence suggests that without the inhibiting presence of SADC forces, the group can solidify its territorial control and push further toward urban areas, destabilizing the city of Goma - a crucial strategic and commercial hub. Additionally, the ADF, using its transnational links with the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP), can exploit the reduced security loopholes to escalate its attacks on both military and civilian targets. This not only poses a local threat but also that of cross-border incursions into Uganda.
Furthermore, a struggle for control of natural resources, including coltan, gold, and tin, is often cited as a root cause of violence in Eastern DRC. Without an effective military presence to take down these illicit networks, armed groups may consolidate their hold on resource-rich territories. This consolidation funds their operations and fuels further conflict, creating a self-perpetuating cycle of violence. The SADC forces' withdrawal highly diminishes prospects for regional concerted responses to insecurity in Eastern DRC. SADC's intervention was part of a broader regional security agreement intended to halt the strength of insurgent militias and establish stability. However, the withdrawal reduces the potential for intelligence sharing, joint operations, and collective border management.
The withdrawal also exacerbates existing tensions between the SADC and the EACRF. These competing regional mechanisms are already beset by rival mandates and a lack of interoperability. SADC's exit leaves a disproportionate burden on the EACRF, which is itself facing political and logistical reversals. The lack of collective regional action may create disparate responses, with armed groups exploiting jurisdictional loopholes and operational ineffectiveness.
This withdrawal further increases risks to civilians, who remain the primary victims of violence linked to conflicts. In the absence of a valid military deterrent, armed groups can intensify village attacks, targeted assassinations, and the use of sexual violence as a weapon of conflict. Civilians in contested areas are exposed to the double threat of direct violence and compelled displacement.
Regional Consequences of SADC's Withdrawal
SADC's retreat has regional stability implications beyond the DRC. The Great Lakes are already politically volatile, and the withdrawal could have knock-on effects in neighbouring countries. For instance, Rwanda and Uganda - both of which have been involved for years in Eastern DRC's wars- might increase their influence, with proxy wars becoming more plausible. Furthermore, the removal of SADC's security presence would destabilize economic activity along cross-border trade routes, compromising regional economic integration efforts under the SADC RISDP. SADC's void would also create space for more intervention by other parties, such as the African Union or even private military firms, further entangling peace processes.
Future Scenarios and Policy Considerations
Several future scenarios emerge from SADC's withdrawal from the Eastern DRC. In the absence of immediate alternatives, the prospects are high for increased violence and territorial gains by armed groups. Or, the withdrawal could catalyze fresh diplomatic efforts to address the root causes of the conflict through political dialogue and regional cooperation. SADC can explore non-military options to mitigate the risks of withdrawal, such as supporting governance reforms, fostering inclusive peace processes, and enhancing regional intelligence-sharing mechanisms. Increasing the mandate of MONUSCO and demanding greater African Union involvement can also pacify the region.
In sum, the withdrawal of SADC troops from Eastern DRC is a turning point for regional stability. Although the action is driven by economic, political, and strategic interests, its consequences can be far-reaching. The resulting security vacuum can embolden armed groups, destabilize regional integration, and tarnish SADC's image as a guarantor of security. Looking forward, there is an urgent need for coordinated regional approaches that balance military engagement with diplomatic and developmental responses to address the underlying causes of conflict. Only through collective effort and innovative policy responses can the region hope for lasting peace and stability.
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