South Africa, Swaziland, and the USA: Unpacking Southern Africa’s Hidden Security Crisis on Borders, Crime, and Prisoner Transfers

On an otherwise uneventful day in July 2025, a discreetly chartered plane touched down at Eswatini's main airport, carrying five individuals who had been convicted of serious crimes in the United States. These men, originating from Vietnam, Jamaica, Laos, Cuba, and Yemen, had no prior residence or legal connections to Eswatini. Within a few hours, they were placed in maximum security detention, officially labeled by authorities as being "in transit." The lack of public announcements, the absence of parliamentary oversight, and vague explanations highlighted an irregularity that demands the attention of security experts throughout the region. For an analyst, this incident is like a lightning flash in a storm, revealing the outlines of a much larger security landscape. From a realist perspective, this transfer represents an exercise in power projection and the outsourcing of liabilities. Washington has discovered a way to remove politically sensitive individuals without the complications of repatriation talks or contentious deportation disputes at home. 

Constructivist theory encourages us to consider how concepts of sovereignty and legitimate governance are being redefined through quietly sanctioned back-channel agreements. Institutionalism cautions that bypassing legal frameworks - even for practical reasons - undermines public trust and the integrity of state institutions. Securitization theory helps us understand how a legal or penitentiary management issue can quickly be reframed as an existential security threat, justifying extraordinary intelligence and enforcement mobilization. The physical border terrain linking South Africa with Eswatini and Lesotho covers thousands of square kilometers of rural land with sparse policing infrastructure. In these borderlands, one often finds only territorial markers or occasional patrols. Historically, porous boundaries facilitated mutual trade and familial connections. 

Unfortunately, criminal networks have exploited these gaps over time. Wireless local transport systems and place-based knowledge empower organized criminal groups involved in illicit mining, arms trafficking, or people smuggling to evade detection. Intelligence monitoring has documented route shifts corresponding with weather cycles, major holidays, or enforcement surges, yet enforcement responses remain reactionary and short-lived rather than anticipatory and sustained. Within Eswatini - and similarly within Lesotho - institutional capacity is fragile. Their citizen economies are small and undiversified. Prisons operate at well over twice their capacity (170%) and function with limited funding, minimal oversight, inconsistent legal representation, and little rehabilitative programming. Authorities have periodically employed early or conditional release schemes as emergency solutions to overcrowding. These mechanisms can temporarily ease pressure, yet when not accompanied by surveillance, support networks, and post-release tracking, they create blind spots. Individuals with histories of violent behavior or organized criminal affiliation may move with relative ease across borders, leading to potential exploitation by criminal networks.

Another aspect to consider is the United States' policy on deporting individuals to third countries. This policy permits U.S. authorities to deport people convicted of serious offenses - not necessarily citizens of the third country - to any nation willing to accept them. Such agreements cater to domestic political interests by removing potentially dangerous individuals from public view. For nations like Eswatini, this arrangement might initially appear beneficial, offering aid or diplomatic benefits without attracting media attention. However, for the region, particularly South Africa, it presents significant challenges. Hosting individuals with violent criminal tendencies can lack clear legal authority, narrative control, or long-term strategy. 

The secretive nature of the Eswatini transfer, the denial of involvement by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the lack of parliamentary or legal documentation, and the temporary classification of detainees as transients indicate governance weaknesses that compromise sovereignty and invite instability. We can learn from a 2023 incident in another region where a similar transfer took place. In that case, fictional Country X accepted foreign prisoners with no apparent connections and no clear process for their arrival. Within weeks, two of these detainees escaped. One crossed into a neighboring area and was later involved in a kidnapping. This precedent serves as a warning. Even a seemingly discreet transfer can escalate into a cross-border crisis, involving criminal violence, law enforcement challenges, and political repercussions. Analyzing the situation using a frequency and impact matrix reveals three critical scenarios. The first scenario involves a moderate likelihood and high impact event where one or more transferred detainees evade detection and enter South Africa. 

There, they could join illegal mining operations, offer violent support or technical expertise, and contribute to increased criminal violence. The second scenario is somewhat less likely but still poses a risk: domestic unrest in Eswatini could result from public awareness of the transfer, leading to political protests or institutional backlash that disrupts cooperation with regional partners. The third scenario, initially low in probability but strategically significant, involves the repeated normalization of secretive third-country transfers, which could weaken adherence to the rule of law in small states, undermine regional governance norms, and pave the way for authoritarian practices and legal erosion.

In the realm of intelligence operations, this situation necessitates rapid and layered responses. The first action is to conduct biometric verification and register the identities of the individuals involved. Comprehensive digital scans, cross-referenced with global law enforcement databases, will verify identities and reveal any aliases or links to criminal organizations. Next, there should be integrated liaison arrangements with Eswatini’s correctional services and internal security systems, established under bilateral agreements that ensure confidentiality and facilitate real-time sharing of custody data and planned transfers. Additionally, predictive models should be created using geospatial intelligence, incorporating route sensors, mobile phone signal distribution, informant data from border areas, and weather pattern correlations to pinpoint likely entry routes. Furthermore, financial transactions need to be scrutinized for sudden spikes in remittances, supply chain logistics, or cash flows in mining areas that correspond with known criminal hubs. 

Moreover, South Africa must take a diplomatic lead within SADC to create a mandatory framework for third-country deportations, detailing legal requirements, repatriation evidence, human rights compliance measures, and reintegration programs. If these vulnerabilities are not addressed, the combination of porous borders, organized crime syndicates, weak institutional systems, overcrowded prisons, and secret international arrangements could severely compromise regional security resilience. South Africa has a strategic necessity to improve interagency coordination, legal reinforcement, and regional leadership. Missing this opportunity could allow these threats to become entrenched, escalating into crisis points rather than manageable signals. However, if handled carefully, this moment can be pivotal in reinforcing the rule of law, transparency, and cross-border cooperation.

 

Further Reading

1. International Organization for Migration – Safe, Dignified and Rights Based Return and Reintegration
   https://www.iom.int/safe-dignified-and-rights-based-return-and-reintegration
2. Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime – Mapping Organized Criminal Economies in East and Southern Africa
   https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Mapping-organized-criminal-economies-in-East-and-Southern-Africa-GI-TOC-July-2025.pdf
3. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime – Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessments
   https://www.unodc.org/unodc/data-and-analysis/TOC-threat-assessments.html
4. UNDP – Report on Prison Overcrowding and Governance in Southern Africa
   https://www.undp.org/eswatini/news/calls-urgent-reforms-prisons-overflow
5. SADC – Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons
   https://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/protocols/