The U.S. operation in Venezuela, known as Operation
Absolute Resolve, conducted in early January 2026, has sparked one of the
most significant challenges to the international legal order since 1945.
Open-source intelligence reports indicate that this operation led to the
capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, who was subsequently taken into
U.S. custody after coordinated air and special forces strikes (OSINT Report,
2026).
Although various media and policy sources have
shared details of the operation, it is important to note that many tactical and
casualty reports have not been independently verified. What can be confirmed is
the legal, institutional, and normative context within which this operation
must be evaluated, as well as the significant consequences it holds for the
United Nations system, especially the Security Council and its veto mechanism.
1. Operational Claims and Intelligence Assessment
According to open-source intelligence assessments,
the operation involved a comprehensive, multi-domain U.S. military effort,
combining precision airstrikes, special operations forces, maritime resources,
and inter-agency intelligence collaboration (OSINT Report, 2026). The sequence
of events outlined in open reports suggests a strategic model of shaping,
seizing, and exfiltrating, where kinetic actions against Venezuelan military
infrastructure were primarily aimed at ensuring freedom of movement and tactical
surprise, rather than achieving battlefield dominance.
The OSINT report claims that U.S. forces allegedly
neutralized or impaired key Venezuelan military sites, including air defence
systems, command centres, and communication networks, before extracting
President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores into U.S. custody. If
these claims are accurate, it would suggest a decapitation-style operation
intended to temporarily disable the state's response capabilities during a
limited operational timeframe, rather than a broader campaign for territorial
control or prolonged occupation.
From an intelligence standpoint, if the operation
is accurately described, it showcases several advanced capabilities that
warrant further analysis.
Firstly, the operation suggests extensive
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) penetration of Venezuelan
command and security environments. Successfully targeting leadership compounds
and time-sensitive movements would necessitate ongoing access to multi-source
intelligence, likely integrating signals intelligence (SIGINT), geospatial
intelligence (GEOINT), and human intelligence (HUMINT). Such penetration is not
feasible through short-term monitoring, indicating months or even years of preparatory
intelligence gathering and validation.
Secondly, the reported success of the extraction
highlights high-confidence pattern-of-life intelligence on senior Venezuelan
leadership. Pattern-of-life analysis, crucial to modern counterterrorism and
counter-leadership operations, requires detailed knowledge of routines,
security shifts, fallback locations, and contingency plans. As outlined in U.S.
special operations doctrine, missions targeting leadership rely more on
intelligence accuracy, timing, and environmental control than on overwhelming
force (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020).
Thirdly, the operation
exemplifies comprehensive interagency collaboration, reportedly involving the
CIA, NSA, NGA, and U.S. Special Operations Command. This collaboration is
consistent with the U.S. "whole-of-intelligence" approach, where operational
units are integrated into an intelligence fusion framework rather than
functioning as independent military entities.
Historically, such a level of integration has been reserved
for high-priority national security targets, underscoring the view that this
operation was considered a strategic priority rather than a standard law
enforcement action. These reported capabilities align with established U.S.
special operations doctrine, particularly the focus on joint operations,
intelligence superiority, and precise force application as outlined in Joint
Publication 3-05 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020). They also resemble past U.S.
missions targeting regimes or capturing leaders, notably the 1989 Panama
invasion and the capture of Manuel Noriega. In that instance, U.S. forces
similarly combined extensive intelligence preparation, swift military action,
and legal justification to facilitate the transfer of a foreign leader into
U.S. judicial custody (Dinges, 1990).
However, despite the extensive operational claims
circulating in media and policy discussions, no independent United Nations
fact-finding mission or internationally mandated inquiry has yet confirmed
casualty figures, specific strike locations, or the legal justification for the
use of force. Without such verification, casualty estimates and proportionality
assessments remain disputed and incomplete. Consequently, these accounts should
be regarded as provisional OSINT-derived assessments rather than established
facts.
From an intelligence analysis perspective, this distinction
is crucial: OSINT can reveal patterns, intentions, and capabilities, but it
cannot replace independent legal or forensic verification. The analytical
challenge, therefore, lies not only in understanding how the operation may have
unfolded but also in recognizing the limitations of available information and
avoiding premature conclusions in a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape.
1.1 International Law: Clear Norms, Ambiguous Enforcement
Unlike the operational specifics, the legal framework
governing the use of force is clear. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits
the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state (United Nations, 1945). The only recognized exception is Self-defence
under Article 51, in response to an armed attack
1.2 Security Council authorization under Chapter VII
To date, no Security Council resolution authorizing force
against Venezuela has been adopted, nor has the United States demonstrated that
Venezuela initiated an armed attack justifying lawful self-defence as defined
by the International Court of Justice (ICJ, 1986). The forcible capture of a
sitting head of state on foreign soil also violates: (a) the principle of
sovereign equality and (b) the norm of non-intervention Customary protections
surrounding heads of state immunity (Akande & Shah, 2011) From a legal
perspective, therefore, the operation - if conducted as reported - would
constitute a prima facie violation of international law, regardless of the
political justifications put forth by the intervening power.
2. 2. The United Nations and the Structural
Failure of Collective Security
The most significant aspect of this crisis is not found in
military strategies, but in the UN Security Council's structural deadlock,
which hinders its role as the primary authority on global peace and security.
Although the Council was established to have exclusive power to authorize force
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, its functionality is severely limited by
the veto power held by its five permanent members.
In reality, the veto has shifted from a stabilizing tool to
a means of avoiding accountability, especially when alleged violations involve
a P5 nation or its close allies. As Hurd (2017) points out, the Council's power
relies not just on its legal authority but also on consistent enforcement; when
enforcement is applied selectively, its legitimacy diminishes. In such
scenarios, the Council cannot initiate binding investigations, enforce
sanctions, or approve corrective actions, leading to what scholars term as
institutional self-deterrence rather than collective security (Voeten, 2005).
When a permanent member is the alleged violator, enforcement
mechanisms essentially break down, turning the Council from an enforcement
entity into a platform for political signalling. This situation promotes
unilateral actions, weakens deterrence against future breaches, and hastens the
disintegration of the rules-based international order (Krasner, 1999).
This issue is not new. Similar paralysis was evident after:
- ·
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo (1999)
- · The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq (2003)
- ·
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (2022)
In each case, the veto shifted the Council from an
enforcement body to a stage for rhetorical disputes (Bellamy, 2013). Venezuela
seems to be another example of this structural breakdown.
Scholars have long cautioned that selective enforcement
undermines the credibility of international law, encouraging unilateralism and
the erosion of norms (Krasner, 1999; Glennon, 2003). When powerful nations
bypass the UN without repercussions, the rules-based order becomes optional
rather than obligatory.
3. Veto Power as a Security Risk Multiplier
Initially, the veto was justified as a practical concession
to great-power politics. In practice, it has become a systemic weakness.
Empirical studies indicate that frequent use of the veto:
- ·
Promotes unilateral military actions
- ·
Normalizes legal exceptionalism
- ·
Weakens deterrence against future violations
(Voeten, 2005)
If the reported U.S. actions go unchallenged
institutionally, they set a precedent that other powers - such as China,
Russia, or regional hegemons - might invoke in future cross-border operations.
The risk is not the emulation of U.S. values, but the replication of U.S.
actions.
3. 3.1 Strategic Consequences and Intelligence
Forecast
From a strategic intelligence viewpoint, the situation in
Venezuela highlights a broader decline in UN-centred security governance and a
trend towards unilateral actions by major powers. The Security Council's
failure to respond effectively to the U.S. operation - amid significant
disagreements among members regarding legality and sovereignty - demonstrates
how veto politics can paralyze collective decision-making when faced with
actions by major powers (UN meeting records, 5 Jan 2026).
In this scenario,
unilateral or ad hoc coalitions become more appealing to powerful nations
aiming to achieve security goals outside multilateral limitations, a trend
observed in reactions to the crisis that reveal stark geopolitical divisions
between Western and Global South actors (UNSC debates, 2026) (The United
Nations Office at Geneva). This environment increases the risk of retaliatory
or proxy escalation, as states perceive a weakening of norms and may feel
justified in responding asymmetrically; early comments from China, Russia, and
other countries condemning the U.S. action highlight how great-power rivalry
could expand to broader geopolitical arenas if unilateralism goes unpunished
(Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs comments) (ODI: Think change).
The OSINT
report also emphasizes Venezuela's strategic importance in global energy
markets - Venezuela possesses some of the world's largest proven oil reserves -
a factor that contributes to great-power competition but, crucially, does not
provide a lawful basis under international law for military intervention
without Security Council authorization or legitimate self-defence, as
reaffirmed in international legal assessments of the case (UN Charter norms).
Historical evidence further shows that externally imposed regime changes often
lead to prolonged instability rather than long-term security stability,
undermining both regional order and global governance objectives (Dodge, 2013).
Conclusion
Regardless of one's view of the Maduro government's domestic
legitimacy or governance record, the reported U.S. operation in Venezuela has
revealed a deeper and more concerning structural reality: the United Nations
system, as it currently stands, seems unable to effectively constrain or
adjudicate the actions of its most powerful members when they choose to act
unilaterally. This is not just a matter of legal interpretation; it poses a
fundamental challenge to the institutional framework that supports international
peace and security. An immediate example of this paralysis is the response at
the United Nations. During emergency Security Council meetings held after the
operation, diplomats and the Secretary-General expressed serious concerns about
the legality of the U.S. actions and the potential for wider regional
instability, yet the Council itself was unable to take any meaningful action
because the United States, as a permanent member, holds a veto that effectively
protects it from institutional accountability within that body. This situation
was noted by legal experts who argue that, although the operation may have
violated core prohibitions under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, the Council
lacks the ability to challenge such conduct when a P5 member obstructs
enforcement efforts.
The Security Council is both the guardian of collective
security and a body whose enforcement procedures break down when a major power
is involved, which is the paradox at the core of this dilemma. States having
the most power to influence international security can also shield themselves
from institutional penalty as long as the veto is unassailable, so transforming
the Council into a discussion forum rather than a defender of legal standards.
This structural limitation reduces the normative power of the Charter as a
restraint on interstate violence and threatens the UN's intended monopoly on
the lawful use of force.
The wider ramifications go beyond legal theory and into the
field of international security operations. The idea that international laws
and standards apply globally rather than selectively is undermined when
powerful states are perceived to operate with impunity, defending violent
extraterritorial operations on the grounds of domestic indictments or disputed
claims of self-defence. According to the UN Secretary-General, such acts run
the risk of creating risky precedents that would inspire other nations to take
similar unilateral moves, which might exacerbate already-existing crises or
spark new ones.
In this way, Venezuelan sovereignty may not be the only
long-term casualty of the Venezuela case. A return to power-based diplomacy,
when intelligence superiority and unilateral capacity take the place of
legitimacy, multilateral consensus, and rule-bound negotiation, might have a
more significant impact by further undermining the precarious architecture of
collective security itself. The fundamental tenets of the post-1945 order run
the risk of gradually eroding in the absence of institutional reform, such as
reevaluating the veto or strengthening accountability mechanisms outside the
Security Council, with implications for global stability and predictability.
References
Akande, D. and Shah, S. (2011) ‘Immunities of state
officials, international crimes, and foreign domestic courts’, European
Journal of International Law, 21(4), pp. 815–852.
https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chq080
Bellamy, A.J. (2013). The Responsibility to Protect: A
Defense. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dinges, J. (1990) Our Man in Panama: How General Noriega
Used the United States – and Made Millions in Drugs and Arms. New York:
Random House.
Dodge, T. (2013) Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism.
London: Routledge.
Glennon, M.J. (2003) ‘Why the Security Council failed’, Foreign
Affairs, 82(3), pp. 16–35.
Hurd, I. (2017) International Organizations: Politics,
Law, Practice. 3rd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
International Court of Justice (ICJ) (1986) Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), Judgment of 27 June. The Hague: ICJ.
Joint Chiefs of Staff (2020) Joint Publication 3-05:
Special Operations. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense.
Krasner, S.D. (1999) Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
United Nations (1945) Charter of the United Nations.
San Francisco: United Nations.
Voeten, E. (2005) ‘The political origins of the UN Security
Council’s ability to legitimize the use of force’, International
Organization, 59(3), pp. 527–557. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081830505018X
Primary OSINT Source
OSINT Intelligence Report (2026) OSINT Intelligence
Report – US Military Intervention in Venezuela. Internal open-source
intelligence assessment, January 2026. Unpublished document.
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