Rapid Sitrep: Former JNIM Commander Who Defected to ISSP Details Reasons Behind Decision

Saaʿd

Bottom Line Up Front

On 16 February 2026, it was posted in an Islamic State chatroom that a former commander of al-Qaeda's West African branch, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), known by the name Saaʿd, has released several audio recordings detailing his reasoning for his defection to Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP). 

What you need to know

At the time of this report, Saaʿd's date of defection is unclear. While Fulcrum Intel Digest will update this piece when we have the recordings, for now we know the following reasons from the chatroom:

The commander feels that Al-Qaeda leadership do not implement Sharia "in it's entirety", despite his own efforts to implement it how he saw fit during several meetings with senior leaders from both JNIM and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).  

Further, Saaʿd's view is that the accusation from Al-Qaeda that ISSP are "Kharijites" is baseless and has “no foundation in the Quran  or the Sunna.” He also did not defect to ISSP for fame or money, because he was financially doing well due to his high stature within JNIM. He says that the reason, instead, was because he saw that ISSP's actions align with their words. 
Important Note: According to a reliable source, Khajirites "are members of an early Islamic sect that emerged in the aftermath of the conflict known as the First Fitna, a civil war that began in 656 CE and ended in 661 CE. Noted for their extreme interpretations of Islamic doctrines, the Khawarij were the first group to break from the established conventions of Islam in favor of an alternate vision of the religion's principles. The group's Arabic name translates into English as "the rebels" or "the seceders," owing to their uprising against the rule of Ali ibn Abi Talib (c. 600 CE–661 CE), the fourth ruler of the Rashidun Caliphate."

Finally, Saaʿd accused JNIM of entering into peace negotiations with Benin and Côte d'Ivoire, which he views as wrong, because it is not allowed for a Muslim to seek reconciliation with the murtadeen [apostates].

Conclusion

This piece will be updated as the story unfolds, but this information appears to make it clear that negotiating with terrorists often does not help. This instance illustrates that a group negotiating with a government lead partly led to a highly capable Jihadi commander joining another extremely dangerous group. It also shows that the world must never forget the sheer brutality that Jihadist groups want to inflict on the world. If one Jihadist group accuses another of not implementing Sharia harshly enough, we can only imagine the horrors that the other group is already carrying out. 

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