Examining the security situation on the African Continent

 

Aviation Security Threats: Component-level MANPADS Proliferation and Insurgent Adaptation in the Sahel Region

A cache of weapons, including MANPADS, in Sudan; Source: The Washington Post.

About the Editor:

Itumeleng Selialia is the Head of Fulcrum Intel Digest and a Senior Intelligence Analyst specializing in African politics, international security, and cross-border relations. She is an academic researcher with expertise in risk and crisis management, and has served as a policy advisor and rapporteur for institutions like the Pan-African Parliament. Her work focuses on geopolitical security, regional integration, and developmental diplomacy, bridging the gap between scholarship and actionable intelligence. She is fluent in multiple African languages.

About the Author: 

Bill Christopher Arputharaj is a research scholar specialising in strategic technologies and national security, with particular expertise in hypersonic weapon systems and their application within modern warfare. A published author, he possesses extensive experience in both academic and applied research concerning contemporary conflict and emerging technologies. His professional interests include aviation security, the aerospace domain, and broader strategic studies, and he welcomes opportunities for collaborative research and high-impact engagement. For all enquiries regarding this research, he may be contacted at christopher240721001@cug.ac.in.

Introduction

The proliferation of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) in the Sahel has transitioned into a sustained operational threat to low-altitude aviation, particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. The central research problem is the misalignment between prevailing system-based proliferation concepts and the emerging reality of component-level proliferation, which causes the systematic underestimation of insurgent operational capabilities. The article applies an intelligence-based analytical methodology that places the vulnerability of aviation in a wider irregular warfare framework characterised by impaired ISR coverage and adaptive adversaries. The analysis indicates that unless threat perception frameworks are recalibrated, aviation operations, both military and civilian, will remain exposed to increasingly sophisticated and less detectable missile threats.This study adopts a qualitative, intelligence-driven methodology combining open-source intelligence (OSINT), conflict databases, defence reports, and visual forensics of insurgent materials to construct a coherent threat assessment. The problem of fragmented and low-visibility data is addressed through triangulation, pattern-of-life analysis, and supply chain mapping, allowing for identification of non-obvious linkages between logistics, technical adaptation, and operational deployment. The methodology has contained the weaknesses of one-source analysis by combining various streams of data and comparative proliferation. The results indicate that a network-centric analytical approach gives a more accurate representation of evolving MANPADS threats than conventional system-based proliferation.

System-Level Proliferation

Existing counter-proliferation frameworks are constrained by system-level analytical bias, which presupposes that the transfer of intact MANPADS units between state inventories is the condition of operational capability. The problem with this method is overreliance on high-signature indicators like bulk transfer and cross-border trafficking. Through a comparative analysis of past and present proliferation, the study identifies that these assumptions are not connected to reality. System-based models cannot encompass modular weapon dynamics, thereby creating intelligence blind spots and underestimating the operational readiness of insurgent groups.

Component-Level Proliferation and its Supply Chain Networks

Component-level proliferation is the specific feature of the modern threat environment, where insurgents acquire and assemble discrete parts of missiles instead of complete systems. The inherent issue with this case is detectability: fragmented components move through informal networks with little visibility. The paper has demonstrated how this decentralised model can enhance the resilience of the insurgents, reduce the risk of interdiction, and develop scalability in the generation of capability by mapping the supply chain and performing trend analysis. Proliferation should now be seen as a process of distributed capability synthesis, and not as a linear transfer of the weapon.

Components of the SA-14 MANPADS system; Source: The US Department of State

The supply chains of MANPADS in the Sahel are associated with a decentralised and adaptive trafficking network over interdiction challenges. The problem lies in the multiplicity of sources, including Libyan stockpiles, regional military leakages, and transnational smuggling routes, which converge in poorly governed spaces such as the Liptako-Gourma region. The analysis of these fragmented flows is aggregated and redistributed by informal economies using geospatial and network-based analysis. The decentralisation of supply chains is an important step towards enhancing the resilience of the system, and a change in the focus to logistical nodes rather than isolated trafficking events.

 Insurgent’s Technical Capabilities and Tactical Integration

A critical dimension of the evolving threat is the development of insurgent technical capacity to assemble and refurbish MANPADS, which transforms dormant components into operational weapons. The issue is that non-state actors' technical competency has been underrated in intelligence estimates. By analysing visual evidence and recovered systems, the study identifies workshop ecosystems capable of conducting repairs, component replacement, and hybrid assembly. Rather than acting as passive receivers, the insurgency groups are now working agents in capability regeneration, hence maintaining long-term workability.

The operational deployment of MANPADS demonstrates tactical sophistication and integration into insurgent doctrine, especially in targeting vulnerable aviation phases. The issue is that it is assumed that insurgents will use those systems sporadically and opportunistically. Through incident analysis and pattern recognition, the study reveals deliberate targeting strategies, including engagement during take-off and landing and integration into coordinated ambushes. The use of MANPADS has become a force multiplier in asymmetric warfare, and it has become a major threat to aviation assets.

Intelligence Blind Spots: Detection and Assessment Issues

A major observation of this study is that there are systemic intelligence blind spots due to obsolete system analytical structures. The crux of the case is that under informal and fragmented networks, as long as high-visibility measures such as bulk transfers and intact weapon systems are involved, component-level proliferation may be low signature. This generates a structural conflict in which ISR and intelligence gathering are best configured to identify traditional patterns of trafficking as opposed to diffused, underground capability building. Based on a gap analysis methodology, this study finds that there are critical shortcomings that exist in three domains: monitoring the flows of disaggregated components in both dual-use and informal supply chains; recognising the technical facilitators and knowledge networks in which assembly and refurbishment take place; and the identification of decentralised workshop ecosystems that can act as capability-generation nodes.

These gaps are further exacerbated by limited integration across HUMINT, SIGINT, and OSINT streams, resulting in fragmented threat assessment and reduced analytical integrity. The operational implication is a systematic underestimation of insurgent capacity, generating an impression of containment of the threat. In fact, proliferation has shifted towards adaptive, networked, and resilient forms, increasing the risk of strategic and tactical surprise. The transition towards network-centric intelligence models, incorporating supply-chain analytics and multi-source fusion, is essential to restore predictive accuracy and effectively counter the evolving MANPADS threat.

Aviation Security and Force Protection

The dynamic MANPADS threat environment in the Sahel poses direct and increasing aviation security, force protection, and mission assurance challenges, especially in low-altitude operational envelopes. The fundamental issue is the mismatch between capabilities and countermeasures, in which the currently deployed defensive systems and flight procedures are still tuned to the past threshold of threat forces, whilst insurgent forces are becoming more adaptable, decentralised, and less predictable in terms of missile capabilities. Rotary-wing platforms, which perform ISR, CASEVAC/MEDEVAC, and troop insertion missions, are particularly susceptible due to extended time in engagement zones, whereas fixed-wing aircraft present an increased risk during important flight segments, such as take-off, landing, and low-altitude transit. The continuity of predictable flight routes, standard approach vectors, and the lack of tactical diversity further increase vulnerability to opportunistic and pre-planned confrontations.

A UN-marked Mil Mi-17 helicopter in Sudan. MANPADS pose an immense risk to aircraft such as the Mi-17, which is used in multi-role capacities as a CASEVAC/MEDEVAC platform. Source: The Washington Post.

As a force protection measure, there is more than airborne vulnerability in airfields, forward operating bases (FOBs), and logistical hubs, wherein limited manoeuvre space and routine operational cycles expose areas of vulnerability to adversary attack. The development of modified MANPADS complicates the assessment of threats and makes the available infrared countermeasures systems and electronic warfare plans ineffective. To overcome these issues, the rapid modification of strategies, methods, and processes is required, including dynamic flight profiles, irregular routing, increased use of Directional Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM), and improved ISR coverage of launch detection. Devoid of adaptive protection solutions and combined anti-air and anti-ground capabilities, aviation assets will continue to be exposed to an increasingly advanced anti-access threat.

Counter-Proliferation Strategy: Network-Centric Response

The poor performance of existing counter-proliferation policies necessitates a switch to network-based solutions that target the broader environment facilitating the production of MANPADS capabilities. The problem is that focus remains on the end-state weapon systems as opposed to the facilities that make them sustainable, including supply chains, technical facilitators, and assembly nodes. Among the recommendations are to prioritise supply chain disruption, identify technical networks, and neutralise decentralised ecosystems. To effectively mitigate proliferation, the paper emphasises the importance of integrated intelligence fusion, adaptive response operations, and precision-targeted interdiction measures that consider the entire proliferation lifecycle rather than isolated transfer events.

The proposed counter-proliferation operations should incorporate multi-domain intelligence integration, combining HUMINT, SIGINT, and OSINT to enhance understanding of proliferation systems. Suggestions include forward-deployed ISR resources and the development of partner-force capabilities to detect and interdict at high logistical nodes in real-time. Also, the implementation of predictive analytics and supply-chain disruption models is encouraged to move from reactive actions to proactive neutralisation. A network-centric approach redefines the battlefield in terms of knowledge, logistics, and adaptive systems, thereby improving operational capability and reducing the sustainability of threats posed by insurgent air defence systems.

Two Strela-2 MANPADS found in the Sahel region. Source: The Washington Post

Conclusion

The MANPADS threat in the Sahel represents a structural shift from visible weapon transfers to concealed capability generation, challenging traditional security architectures. The problem of analytical misalignment continues to be the main challenge in the intelligence and policy sphere. This study demonstrates the need to rethink proliferation models by applying a multi-source, intelligence-based approach. The inference is obvious: the lack of adaptation in analytical and operational frameworks will lead to further vulnerability, where MANPADS encounters will not be exceptional but a predictable consequence of the dynamic threat environment.