Humanitarian Rhetoric, Strategic Interests, and the Politics of Contradiction: UNSC, Arms Exports, and the Gaza Conflict

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The Israel–Gaza conflict serves as a lens through which the inconsistencies of global diplomacy are revealed. On one side, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and General Assembly (UNGA) are platforms rich with humanitarian discourse: repeated calls for ceasefires, humanitarian corridors, and a sustainable two-state solution are common. Conversely, the same nations making these declarations often bolster Israel’s military strength through arms sales, collaborative defence initiatives, and diplomatic protection. The disparity between rhetoric and action has seldom been so pronounced. The events of 2024-2025 - notably the mass walk-out during Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s UNGA speech and the debate over the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) arrest warrant against him - sharply illustrate these tensions. They also emphasize the interaction between normative actions (symbolic condemnation), legal frameworks (international courts), and material interests (defence tra...

A Shadow Caliphate: The Enduring Threat of the Islamic State Khorasan Province


Islamic State Khorasan Propaganda Targets New Audience with Release of Pashto Magazine Khurasan Ghag. Source: The Jamestown Foundation.

The global struggle against Islamist terrorism has shifted, and a new focal point of concern has emerged from the rugged mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-KP), the regional branch of the broader Islamic State (IS), has transformed from a territorial insurgency into a sophisticated, transnational threat. As the West's attention has pivoted towards other geopolitical flashpoints, IS-KP has demonstrated a resilience and a capacity for external operations that should be a cause for grave concern in Washington, London, and beyond.

Origins and History

IS-KP's origins are rooted in a schism within the jihadist landscape of Central and South Asia. The group officially announced its formation in January 2015, born out of the allegiance of disgruntled commanders from Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and former Afghan Taliban fighters to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the then-leader of the core Islamic State. These defectors were dissatisfied with the TTP's and Taliban's perceived nationalism and their willingness to engage in peace talks with what IS-KP considered apostate government. They were drawn to the transnational, apocalyptic vision of a global caliphate offered by IS. Initially, IS-KP focused on establishing a territorial foothold in eastern Afghanistan's Nangarhar province, where it engaged in a brutal three-way conflict with the Afghan government and its American allies, as well as the Taliban. The group achieved a degree of success in this period, controlling small pockets of land and attracting foreign fighters. However, a sustained counter-insurgency campaign by U.S. and Afghan forces, alongside intense pressure from the Taliban, severely degraded its territorial holdings by 2019. This defeat forced IS-KP to undergo a significant organisational restructuring, shifting its strategy from holding territory to a more clandestine, urban-centric model of insurgency. The Taliban's swift takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021 provided a temporary, albeit chaotic, opportunity for IS-KP to regenerate, culminating in the horrific attack on Kabul airport during the evacuation.

Ideology

The ideology of IS-KP is a mirror image of its parent organisation, the core Islamic State, but with a specific regional focus. It adheres to an ultra-radical Salafi-jihadist doctrine that rejects any form of compromise with "unbelievers" and "apostates." This uncompromising worldview places it in direct ideological conflict not only with the West and regional governments, but also with the Taliban. Unlike the Taliban, which is primarily focused on establishing an emirate within Afghanistan's borders, IS-KP's ultimate goal is the establishment of a global caliphate, starting in the historical Khorasan region (which it defines as encompassing parts of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia). This broader, more violent agenda is a key reason for its recruitment success among disaffected militants and its systematic targeting of Shia Muslims, whom it considers heretics. IS-KP's propaganda consistently portrays the Taliban as corrupt and insufficiently radical, thereby positioning itself as the true purveyor of global jihad. The group's media wing, Al-Azaim, and its English-language magazine, Voice of Khurasan, are crucial to this effort, disseminating a consistent stream of propaganda that delegitimises its rivals and appeals to a global audience.

Successes and Failures

IS-KP's history is one of tactical adaptation in the face of significant setbacks. Its greatest failures have been its inability to hold territory in the face of concerted military pressure. The loss of its "mini-caliphate" in Nangarhar was a decisive blow. However, the group’s most notable successes have been in its ability to adapt and project power beyond its immediate operating environment. Following the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, IS-KP seized the opportunity to portray the new government as an illegitimate, "nationalist" entity that had compromised with the West. It launched a series of high-profile, high-casualty attacks on both Taliban and civilian targets. While the Taliban's counter-terrorism efforts have degraded IS-KP's operational capacity within Afghanistan, the group's most recent and alarming success has been its ability to orchestrate and inspire attacks in foreign countries. The horrific mass shooting in Moscow in March 2024 and other foiled plots in Europe are a testament to this shift. These external operations serve a dual purpose: they undermine the Taliban's claim to have brought security and stability to Afghanistan and they elevate IS-KP's status within the global jihadist movement.

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)

IS-KP's TTPs are a blend of classic insurgent tactics and modern, digitally-enabled terrorism. The group employs a range of methods, including:

Asymmetric Warfare: Targeting soft targets such as schools, hospitals, and places of worship, particularly those of Shia minorities.

Urban Terrorism: Utilising suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and small arms attacks in cities to maximise casualties and sow fear.

Transnational Attack Planning: Operating through decentralised, clandestine cells, often composed of individuals from Central Asian states like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, who can leverage their legal residency in other countries to facilitate attacks abroad. This is a significant shift, with a growing number of plots linked to individuals from these backgrounds.

Sophisticated Propaganda: Using online platforms to disseminate slick, professionally produced videos and publications to recruit new members, incite violence, and claim responsibility for attacks. The group has shown particular skill in targeting Russian-speaking audiences and using encrypted messaging apps to provide tactical guidance to recruits. The propaganda also specifically targets China, citing its treatment of Uyghur Muslims and its ties to the Taliban.

The Future of the Threat

The future of IS-KP is inextricably linked to the stability of the Taliban's rule and the broader geopolitical environment. While the Taliban has made some progress in suppressing IS-KP through a mix of selective repression and targeted raids, its counter-terrorism efforts have been hampered by a lack of capacity and a porous border. The Taliban has a vested interest in containing IS-KP to prove its legitimacy as a governing authority, but its efforts have not been sufficient to dismantle the group's clandestine urban cells or prevent its external plotting. The primary concern for Western intelligence agencies is IS-KP's proven ability to orchestrate and inspire attacks far from its base of operations. The group's decentralised structure and reliance on a global network of sympathisers and foreign fighters make it a formidable and difficult-to-track threat. The relative autonomy of its regional branches, a consequence of the core Islamic State's decline, allows for greater operational flexibility. A recent lull in the number of successful attacks should not be misinterpreted as a sign of permanent decline; instead, it may be a period of regrouping and planning.

As the international community grapples with myriad other crises, the IS-KP threat has been allowed to metastasise. The group's continued existence and its demonstrated external capabilities represent a clear and present danger. A failure to address the underlying conditions that allow groups like IS-KP to thrive—such as instability, sectarian grievances, and a permissive digital environment—could mean that the recent attacks are not an anomaly, but a forewarning of a more volatile and dangerous era to come. Countering this evolving threat will require not only robust intelligence sharing and border security but also a concerted effort to combat the online radicalisation that is now at the heart of IS-KP's strategy.

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