GRAPHIC CONTENT WARNING: This article contains graphic descriptions of violence and terrorism that may be upsetting to some readers. Reader discretion is advised.
Bottom Line Up Front
2025 has shown us that Africa remains one of the most important theatres of operation for terrorist actors. There have been numerous developments this year and it is likely that 2026 will be more volatile than 2025 in the face of continued tensions (including with foreign partners and regional players), terrorist attacks, and attacks by armed political groups. Factors like climate change, political tensions, poverty, and foreign interference could also exacerbate the situation.
Islamic State
Islamic State (IS) continues operations and attacks across numerous African theatres. The following infographic was released by the group, showing the most prominent assaults during the Islamic months of Rabi al-Awal and Rabi al-Akhar. Out of the seven attacks listed, only two are outside Africa. This highlights the continued importance of Africa for IS operations as well as the fact that large numbers of people suffer and are killed at the hands of IS in Africa. The number of Christians targeted in Africa is striking.
Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP)
ISCAP remains one of the most prolific actors on the continent. The group's
propaganda campaign is steadfast in its goal to win hearts and minds. As can be seen in their
September 2025 video, the group is actively targeting Muslims from multiple Central-and-East African countries for recruitment into ISCAP. It is likely that the propaganda will lead to an influx of fighters and non-fighting members into the group's cells in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
ISCAP is further notable for its rare, but continued, attacks in
Uganda as well as for threatening to strike in the capital, Kampala. The fact that Uganda is presented in ISCAP propaganda as a target, should be concerning to the international and regional communities.
ISCAP continues to specifically state in their propaganda that they are purposefully targeting Christians in the DRC. In a recent poster, the group stated that during the Islamic month of Jumada al-Ula, that they carried out 66 attacks in DRC in that month alone. The poster states that 383 people were killed of which 318 were Christians, 45 were armed forces, and 20 were local militias (likely local self-defence forces). The post continues, stating that 209 houses were burnt alongside 10 barracks and 6 vehicles. Despite the enormous numbers of people who suffer at the hands of ISCAP, international media rarely reports on ISCAP's actions, meaning that international attention is drawn away from the situation in DRC and, instead, to Gaza and Ukraine.
Islamic State Somalia (ISS)
ISS continues its campaign in Puntland where it regularly targets the Puntland armed forces. A claim of credit for an attack on 17 Jumada Al-Ula, states that ISS killed 30 members of the Puntland armed forces in an ambush. It should be noted that ISS publishes some claims of credit from its Amaq News Agency. Every claim of credit for an attack from IS is issued from the Nashir News Agency, while claims from the Amaq News Agency are only issued for attacks that the group deems strategically important, or if they are notable for another reason such as a high casualty count or a novel location. The attack in Puntland that allegedly killed 30 soldiers was given an Amaq claim.
Claim of credit from Nashir News Agency
Claim of Credit from Amaq News Agency
ISS continues to indoctrinate and recruit new members online, as is the case with all IS Wilayahs (Provinces - Regions as designated by IS). The below example illustrates the kind of rhetoric used by IS, specifically in Somalia. Their campaign to deliberately target security forces is clearly illustrated.
Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP)
ISSP continues assaults in its theatres of operation including Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. The group recently claimed to have killed "around seventy" members of the Burkina Faso Army in Oudalan and on 22 Jumada al-Ula, they claimed to have killed 36 members of al-Qaeda's branch in West Africa, Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM). It is possible that clashes between JNIM and ISSP will increase in 2026 or be more common than they were this year. These clashes increase instability in an already-fragile environment.
As this blog has noted in the past, ISSP continues its sophisticated propaganda game, through professional and highly-edited
videos from the region. It is likely that recruitment into the group continues. The vast open deserts of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso make counter-terrorism especially difficult, while the rainy seasons continue to bring their own challenges. With climate change worsening, the seasonal variations in many parts of Africa pose increasing challenges to both counter-terrorism actors and civilians affected negatively by climate change.
Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)
ISWAP is arguably one of the most active IS Wilayahs. The group is mainly active in Nigeria's Borno State, where they attack civilians and armed forces alike.
The group is relentless in its assaults. On 17 November 2025, the group carried out what they called a qualitative ambush in Wajiroko, insinuating that they abducted an army brigade commander during the ambush. Wajiroko is located near Sambisa forest where ISWAP has camps and hideouts. The Nigerian army
stated that two soldiers and two members of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) were killed in the ambush. The army also said that the army brigade commander was not abducted and that this was fake news.
Images recently circulated in IS channels online showing the distribution of a printed version of IS's weekly magazine, an-Naba. This is a notable development and likely points to the fact that there is limited access to the internet and to cellphones or laptops where the digital version of Naba is accessible. It could also be a more secure way of spreading propaganda than spreading it online and is perhaps more appealing to individuals in rural communities without internet and technology access.
Though rarely reported on, ISWAP remains active in Cameroon's Far-North Region. On 14 Jumada al-Ula, the group claimed credit for an attack on an army camp in Bonderi town. Attacks in Far-North Region are likely to continue in 2026 and it is possible that they could intensify.
An extremist Islamist group called the Lakurawas, operating in Nigeria, is said by some to be linked to ISWAP, but this remains unclear. It will be noteworthy if the Lakurawas pledge allegiance to IS in 2026.
Islamic State - Mozambique (IS-M)
Targeted attacks against Christians and armed forces continue in Mozambique. In a recent notable incident, the group carried out an attack against a navy patrol near the island of Mueng in Mocimboa de Praia, Cabo Delgado Province. It is likely that attacks against naval forces of Mozambique will continue. A notable tactic in attacks against Christians is arson. Burning down their infrastructure including houses, school, and shops, destabilises the area and causes an increase in internally displaced people (IDPs).
TotalEnergies is expected to restart work on its LNG plant in Cabo Delgado. The restart should be watched closely. It is likely that IS-M will take advantage of negative sentiment from local residents who are disillusioned with the Mozambican government who are profiting off the LNG project while local residents suffer in harsh economic and physical conditions. The restart of work is likely to draw media attention and it remains to be seen how many of the terrorism-related developments in Mozambique will be covered by the media.
Sudan
Islamic state does not have an official branch in Sudan yet, but the group has produced some statements and editorials on the conflict in Sudan, critiquing the denial by foreign powers that they are involved in exacerbating the Sudan civil war. IS also critiques the warring factions in Sudan stating that they are enemies of Islam, used as proxies by foreign powers who want influence in Sudan.
Keeping up with the propaganda from IS on Sudan can provide insight on how IS views the various parties involved in the war and on whether they officially expand into Sudan.
Al-Qaeda
JNIM
JNIM remains a highly prolific actor in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso (it is also active in other countries such as Benin and Togo). In addition to carrying out day-to-day attacks, the group has ongoing recruitment campaigns and training camps. JNIM's economic warfare campaign against the Malian Junta that took the form of a fuel blockade is ongoing. The blockade has raised
fears that the group would take over the capital, Bamako, and subsequently, the entire country. An Al-Qaeda affiliate has never before taken power of an entire nation and if this does happen, it would profoundly shift regional security dynamics and have catastrophic consequences for the people of Mali.
JNIM's recent geographical
expansion into Nigeria is an issue to watch. Though the cell that carried out the first JNIM attack in Nigeria appeared small, the attack in a new theatre of operation is highly significant. Security forces and other counter-terrorism resources like finances and weaponry are already spread thin in Nigeria with the country battling ISWAP, Bandits, the Lakurawas, violent crime and transnational-organised crime, among others and other security issues.
JNIM's recent missionary activity in the Timbuktu Region of Mali highlights its ongoing on-the-ground recruitment and radicalisation efforts. The large amounts of potential recruits seen in the images from JNIM's official propaganda outlet, Az-Zallaqa Media, is striking.
Children can be seen in the areas where JNIM carried out some of its recruitment activities, while preaching and missionary activities also took place inside mosques:
The group frequently shows off its impressive weapons collections, highlighting their military strength and capability:
JNIM frequently posts imagery from its training camps, further highlighting that they are organised and have large cells of fighters:
These factors all illustrate why JNIM should be on analysts' radar when talking about African terrorism.
Al-Shabaab
Al Shabaab continues attacks in Somalia, including in the capital, Mogadishu.
The group recently posted photos of the aftermath of an ambush on the Somali special forces on the road between Farsooley town and the Baledogle Air Base in Lower Shabelle Region. The base is currently used by the US Air Force who train Somali forces and conduct counterterrorism actions including drone operations in the region.
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| Satellite view of the Baledogle Air Base |
In terms of propaganda theatre expansion, one of Al-Shabaab's official propaganda outlets, Shahada News Agency, recently expanded to the secure messaging app, Signal. This is a notable development and could indicate that Shabaab's media houses are looking for more secure and private communications platforms. This could either be to completely migrate from their surface web presence to privacy-focussed and secure platforms, or to have a secure and private platform within their propaganda-spreading capabilities in addition to what they currently have.
As always, Shabaab shows no signs of relenting. Their hearts-and-minds campaign continues in the form of their strong online presence alongside on-the-ground recruitment campaigns. Their expansion onto Signal should be monitored, and their attacks in Kenya along the Somali border should be tracked to effectively counter their expansion into Northern Kenya.
Disclaimer: This is a predictive outlook based on current trends on the continent. The analysis contained within this article is based on the writer's informed and educated opinion, supported by evidence. The author of this article does not claim to be able to predict the future and since the situations described in this article are highly volatile, they may change as the situation on the ground develops. This article is also not a list of every single terrorist group on the continent, and instead, it aims to inform readers about prominent actors on the continent that are likely to play significant roles in 2026. This analysis deliberately excludes armed political groups.
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