Framing Conflict: The Sahel's Video Propaganda Game
WARNING: THIS BLOG CONTAINS DESCRIPTIONS OF GRAPHIC VIOLENCE AND CONTENT SOME MAY FIND DISTURBING. READER DISCRETION IS ADVISED.
The Sahel is a noteworthy case study in the use of videos for propaganda by armed groups. Certain parts of the region are information-poor and internet connectivity in many parts of the Sahel is limited or completely inaccessible. This means that any information coming from the region, such as for example from the deserts of Agadez in Niger, is enticing and usually grabs the viewer's attention simply for being somewhat unusual and interesting.
Video propaganda is therefore used by different kinds of players in the Sahel, such as armed political groups and terrorist organisations. Videos are highly effective for propaganda because visuals transport the viewers to the scene of the imagery and give them a rare chance to see more than just news reports or social media posts in the form of text from people on the ground. Videos are even more eye-catching than photos due to their ability to transport make the viewer feel as if they are a part of the imagery.
Disclaimer: This article explores a few videos from the Sahel in order to make an assessment of the effectiveness of the use of video footage for propaganda purposes in the region. This article does not claim to be an exhaustive list of videos from non-state actors in this region in any time period. It is also not a list of security incidents during any time period and does not claim to analyse every significant event in the Sahel during any time period.
Patriotic Movement for Freedom and Justice (MPLJ)
The MPLJ is an armed political group based in Niger's Agadez Region. The group aims to restore democracy to Niger and to oust the Junta authorities in Niamey.
In the below statement from the group, the MPLJ claims credit for an attack on 2 September 2025 in Abalama, Agadez Region, stating that they will continue further attacks. The Nigerien army claimed that the attack was planned "from Libya" and financed by a foreign power, further stating that the attackers were recruited as mercenaries, for 500,000 CFA francs each. The army also said that two soldiers were killed in the attack and four others wounded. According to the army, two of the attackers were killed and seven others arrested.
It should also be noted that the MPLJ frequently highlights that foreign companies are exploiting the country's natural resources, particularly in the North of the country where Agadez Region is. China notably funded the Agadem Oil Pipeline which runs from Niger to Benin where it is then exported abroad. The Niger National Office of Publication and Press (ONEP) said that the attack in Abalama targeted two positions of the Niger National Guard (GNN) including the departmental patrol position and the security position of the base of the Chinese company responsible for building the Agadez-Zinder road. The MPLJ's campaign against foreign economic interest in Niger is thus clear.
As can be seen from an official statement from the group, published on 3 September 2025, they call on the armed forces of Niger to abandon their support for the authorities in Niamey:
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| Original French Press Release |
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| Machine Translation to English using Google Translate |
It is important to talk about armed political groups in the Sahel and in the AES states specifically, because they are relatively unknown and under-reported by the mainstream media, yet still significant. Their relative geographic isolation, accentuated by harsh climates, highlights that they have useful knowledge of how to survive in difficult environments, which possibly gives them an edge over their enemies who in some cases may not have the same knowledge of the terrain in a ground offensive, in some cases.
The MPLJ released a video in September 2025 in the Toubou language, where its leader, Moussa Kounaï, and a group of fighters can be seen in the harsh desert, most likely in Agadez Region. In the video, he says that democracy, the release of Mohamed Bazoum (the democratically-elected ex-President of Niger), and a return to constitutional order, are the only solutions to end hostilities and restore the rule of law in the country. He details that if it is deemed necessary, their struggle will continue and they will continue to target Chinese companies who operate in the North of the country, exploiting the country's oil.
In comparison to the videos discussed further below, the MPLJ's videos are rudimentary. They do not contain fancy graphics and it appears the MPLJ's videos are taken on a cellphone without much preparation or setup. The MPLJ's videos have never contained training footage showing organised rows of dozens of fighters, nor do the videos last for very long. They are short, with the September 2025 video lasting for only 1 minute and 15 seconds. The group does not speak of religion and their main point of contention, according to their videos and statements, is ousting the Junta in Niamey and not imposing a religious ideology.
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| Screenshot from the September 2025 MPLJ video |
Azawad Liberation Front (FLA)
The FLA is a coalition of Tuareg political and armed groups based in Mali. The group is more active on social media than the MPLA.
On 23 August 2025, the FLA posted a video on their X page showing a first person view of a Kamikaze drone attack targeting a meeting between the Malian government and African Corps representatives in Tessalit, Kidal Region, Mali on the same day. The FLA claimed that they killed an unspecified amount of people.
The video's editing dramatises the attack. The background music is marked by string instruments that gradually increase in pitch to the point where the drone hits its target. The FLA's logo is shown in the bottom left of the video and a picture of an FLA fighter sits in the middle at the bottom of the screen the entire way. Before the drone hits its target, the video is paused and the screen is highlighted in red. After the drone hits its target, the music ends and a larger version of the FLA fighter's face superimposed on a drone is shown, highlighting the FLA's drone capabilities. Finally, a message displays in English reading "The Backlash Against The Aggression".
A similar video was posted by the group on 6 September 2025, showing an attack a day before, targeting the Amachach military base in Tessalit. Again, the music is highly dramatic: instrumental electronic music that one would associate with an action film.
The viewer is shown a red target circle and the target building is also highlighted in red. This video also ends with a display of the message "The Backlash Against The Aggression".
The FLA also posts other kinds of videos. On 12 September they published a video showing The Final Declaration of the First Ordinary Session of the Revolutionary Council of Azawad. Members are seen in attendance and in contrast to the other groups mentioned in this article, some women are seen in the FLA videos. One video specifically shows a speech by the representative of the women members of the Council:
Another video shows a speech by the President of the Council, Bilal Ag Acherif:
These kinds of videos portray that the group is focussed on governance and not only on military activity. The videos also highlight the inclusion of women in Council meetings and decision-making processes. This is possibly a deliberate tactic to distinguish themselves from other groups in the region, especially from jihadist groups.
Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM)
In comparison to armed political groups, jihadist terrorist groups in the Sahel publish videos relatively frequently. JNIM, al-Qaeda's branch in West Africa, also use videos to spread propaganda and grab viewer attention. JNIM's videos combine battle and training footage with speeches and addresses from prominent figures in the group. Their videos are also more edited and carefully produced than the examples above, speaking to the fact that they have more money, time, people and other resources to spend on propaganda creation.
JNIM's videos from Burkina Faso and Mali are especially notable and they provide a glimpse into the group's various strategies. A notable theme in some of JNIM's videos is their economic warfare campaign. Recent videos have shown the group blocking off strategic roads and setting convoys of trucks on fire in Mali. At least 40 fuel tankers were destroyed in Mali on 14 September 2025, when JNIM attacked a convoy of over 100 vehicles under military escort. JNIM had declared a blockade on fuel imports, warning that Mali could run out of fuel in two weeks if supplies were cut off. In response, Mali's military conducted airstrikes in the Kayes Region to counter the militants' efforts to restrict fuel access to the capital, Bamako. JNIM have also begun stopping and emptying fuel trucks, affecting local residents.
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| Screenshot from a JNIM video highlighting the blockade against fuel in the area around Kayes and Nioro. Buses are also set alight as part of the campaign and not only fuel tankers are targets of arson. |
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| Screenshot from JNIM video showing burning of fuel tankers as part of the blockade. |
In other videos, JNIM shows its training of new recruits. Notable in the videos is the use of an old Nasheed in the background, likely showing that creating new Nasheeds is not high on the group's list of priorities when creating propaganda videos. Child soldiers can be seen as well as the use of a drone to take an image from above.
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Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP)
Islamic State (IS)'s propaganda is arguably the most sophisticated out of all the actors in the Sahel. The group releases posters before the video, like a teaser, in order to get viewers interested before the video premiers. The posters are of high quality and are designed to catch the eye.
The group recently released a 12-minute 53-second video entitled Lions of the Sahel. Its poster is below:
The opening scene has the subtitle "Documentation of the Latest Operations of the Mujahideen in the Sahel State" and it shows the following attacks:
1. Eknewan, Tahoua Region, Niger on 27 Dhu al-Qidah
The video shows the attackers setting off for the attack, after which the video states they attacked two adjacent army camps. Mounted on the back of a pickup truck appears to be a 23mm anti-Air Gun. The words of the martyr Sheikh Abu Muhammad are played in the background at one point, highlighting that it is noble and honourable to die a martyr. The video shows the attackers pursuing and killing the fleeing soldiers. The video then shows the army barracks and vehicles being burnt. Trenches can be seen around the barracks.
Additionally, two captured soldiers are shown in the video. One is described as the camp commander and his military ID number is shown alongside his rank and name. The other is not described, likely due to his low rank. They are then executed.
Large amounts of weapons and equipment seized as a result of the attack are also shown. This section of the video ends with a summary of the attack which reports 50 soldiers were killed and their commander captured. It states 7 vehicles were burned and two seized.
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| Summary of the Eknewan attack from Lions of the Sahel. |
2. Douchi, Dosso Region, Niger on 6 Dhu al-Qidah
The video shows the attackers setting off for the attack. It then shows their targets in what may be described as the style of a video game, outlining the targets in red brackets. It is notable that the attack targets stationary army vehicles on a paved road. The vehicles were likely there to protect the road or the area. The video shows the killing of soldiers and this part also ends with a summary, showing that the target was a mobile army patrol of 10 vehicles. The summary claims that 16 soldiers were killed and 3 vehicles seized.
3. Sangara, Tillaberi Region, Niger on 13 Dhu al-Qidah
The next attack in the video is on what it calls "militias loyal to the Niger army". The victims were likely a local self-defence group. One of the victims is dressed in yellow-brown clothes embroidered with the Niger flag. At least two of the victims were armed with quivers, a feature of self-defence groups composed of skilled hunters. This part ends too, with a summary showing that 7 were killed and four rifles among other equipment was seized.
4. Sakoira, Tillaberi Region, Niger on 27 Shawwal
This part of the video shows ISSP targeting what they call a group of counter-terrorism forces. The video shows a number of killed soldiers and the burning of a vehicle. The summary shows 12 soldiers were killed and one taken captive. The captive can be seen being taken in the video.
5. Tessit, Gao Region, Mali on 1 Dhu al-Qidah
This attack starts with a very large amount of fighters on motorcycles moving to their target, an army base in Tessit. Trenches can be seen around the base. The video abruptly cuts from the outside view to showing fighters inside the base, killing soldiers. One scene shows 16 soldiers killed. The attackers raid the base and set buildings and vehicles on fire, after which they can be seen praying and celebrating the attack. The large amount of equipment and weapons seized is then shown off for the camera. The summary says that 40 soldiers were killed.
6. Inates, Tillaberi Region, Niger on 23 Dhu al-Hijjah
This attack saw the targeting of the Inates military base with Katyusha rockets, before a ground assault. The voice of Sheikh Al-Najashed plays in the background. The base appears to be situated on a small hill surrounded by rocky terrain, neither of which deterred the attackers. The attackers are seen celebrating, and this section does not contain a summary like all the previous sections. No soldiers can be seen killed in the video during this attack and that is possibly why there was no summary.
7. Bani Bangou, Tillaberi Region, Niger on 23 Dhul al-Hijjah
The terrain of this attack is immediately striking for the large amount of trees and for the well-constructed buildings at the location. This attack targeted an army position in Bani Bangou, Tillaberi Region. No victims are seen in this part of the video, but large amounts of weaponry and equipment can be seen. The summary states that the target was an army camp and government headquarters of the National Guard. The summary claims that "dozens" were killed and 25 vehicles burned.
This video shows that the Sahel remains strategically important for IS, both in terms of military activity and as a theatre to highlight in the group's propaganda.
The video highlights IS's propaganda capacity and shows how much time and effort they put into their propaganda videos to make them highly visually appealing to potential recruits and to IS's supporters.
The video shows that while the Sahel is low on the international community's list of significant conflict-affected zones, it is deeply important to engage with communities to build resilience in order to stem recruitment into ISSP.
Conclusion
It is clear that the Sahel is a highly complex and rapidly-evolving theatre. The use of videos by armed groups in the region and beyond is a tactic that is here to stay. There is no sign that the use of videos for propaganda will stop or that it is ineffective. It will be striking to see how the use of videos by actors in the Sahel adapts as new technology becomes available. Possible new avenues include improved translation mechanisms through the use of AI, which will make it even easier for groups to reach a wider audience. This could be especially useful for Islamic State who already have a robust and effective unofficial multilingual translation mechanism in place through unofficial media outlets such as Fursan al-Tarjuma. Another avenue is the possible increased use of drone footage by actors in the Sahel, specifically JNIM and the FLA, in propaganda videos to make their content even more enticing to audiences. The Sahel remains one of the most important regions in the world for conflict monitoring and the use of sophisticated propaganda videos by actors in the region make this ever clear.
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