South Africa and the Question of Coup Risk: A Critical Assessment

On August 19, 2025, Minister in the Presidency Khumbudzo Ntshavheni refuted allegations that South Africa is at risk of a coup, emphasizing that the nation's constitutional framework remains strong and unshaken. Her remarks came in response to increasing public discourse and media conjecture following the violent unrest in July 2021, ongoing governance issues, and the growing number of military coups in other African countries. While the Minister's assurances are crucial for alleviating concerns, the question persists: is South Africa genuinely shielded from the threat of a coup? This article examines South Africa's current security posture, the resilience of its democratic institutions, and the structural challenges it faces. It then contrasts South Africa's situation with other African nations that have recently undergone coups, before evaluating whether Pretoria's confidence in its stability is justified.

South Africa's Democratic Resilience

Since apartheid ended in 1994, South Africa has been recognized as one of the continent's most stable democracies. Its constitutional system is globally acclaimed, incorporating the separation of powers, a Bill of Rights, and institutions like the Constitutional Court, Public Protector, and the Human Rights Commission. These entities provide legal and institutional barriers against power concentration and ensure accountability. The South African National Defence Force (SANDF), unlike the militaries in many African countries, has historically been professionalized and subject to civilian control. Unlike nations such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, the South African military has not developed a tradition of political intervention. Civil-military relations in South Africa remain largely professional, with the military under strict constitutional oversight. The Defence Act and parliamentary portfolio committees ensure that the SANDF operates within well-defined mandates.

Additionally, South Africa's active civil society and free press serve as watchdogs, consistently monitoring government actions and shaping public opinion. This provides an extra layer of protection against the deterioration of the democratic order. Comparatively, South Africa still possesses a level of institutional strength that many coup-prone countries lack.

Structural Vulnerabilities: Governance and Security Gaps

Despite its robust constitutional framework, South Africa faces increasing vulnerabilities that cannot be overlooked. Chief among these is political instability, socioeconomic inequality, and weak state capacity.

1. Political Instability and Factionalism: The African National Congress (ANC), in power since 1994, is beset by internal conflicts. The 2021 turmoil, sparked by the jailing of former President Jacob Zuma, highlighted how political infighting can lead to widespread violence. Accusations of state capture, corruption, and patronage have diminished confidence in government bodies. Afrobarometer surveys indicate a consistent decline in public trust in political leaders, fostering an environment ripe for populist dissatisfaction.

2. Socioeconomic Inequalities: South Africa continues to be the most unequal nation globally, with a Gini coefficient of 0.63. Ongoing unemployment - around 32%, and failures in service delivery persistently incite protests. "Service delivery protests" have become commonplace, frequently escalating into violent clashes between communities and security forces. This ongoing unrest points to systemic vulnerabilities.

3. Weak State Capacity and Corruption: Corruption scandals, along with inefficiencies in policing and governance, have weakened the state's authority. The July 2021 unrest exposed alarming deficiencies in intelligence coordination, law enforcement capabilities, and political leadership. If state institutions are unable to handle large-scale unrest, their legitimacy is compromised, indirectly fostering conditions for anti-system actors to mobilize.

4. Security Apparatus Under Strain: The SANDF, though professional, is underfunded and stretched thin by peacekeeping missions, outdated equipment, and budget reductions. Meanwhile, the South African Police Service (SAPS) faces criticism for inadequate training, corruption, and excessive force. These challenges raise concerns about the ability of South Africa's security sector to effectively respond to a sudden surge in violence or organized rebellion.

Coup Dynamics in Africa: Comparative Insights

To assess the risk of a coup in South Africa, it is essential to consider the broader context of the continent. From 2020 to 2023, Africa experienced a series of coups in countries like Mali, Guinea, Chad, Sudan, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Several common factors contribute to these events:

·       Weak institutions: Nations with fragile or absent checks on executive power are more susceptible. Military politicization: Armed forces that see themselves as protectors of the state often justify their interventions.

·       Socioeconomic crises: Increasing poverty, unemployment, and inequality heighten instability. Popular disenchantment: Widespread protests and a loss of trust in elected governments often create a conducive environment.

·        External influences: Geopolitical rivalries, involving actors like Russia and France, sometimes worsen instability. In comparison, South Africa differs in significant ways. Its military lacks a history of intervention and remains institutionally under civilian control. However, there are similarities in terms of socioeconomic pressures and governance issues. The violent riots of July 2021, which resulted in nearly 400 deaths and billions in damages, reflected the kind of state fragility that has preceded coups in other African nations. For example, Mali's 2020 coup followed years of frustration with corruption, insecurity, and governance failures.

      Burkina Faso's 2022 coup was triggered by rising insecurity and the government's inability to manage jihadist violence. While South Africa does not face jihadist insurgencies, its governance challenges - corruption, unemployment, and inequality - are similar to the discontent seen elsewhere.

      Coup-Proofing Mechanisms in South Africa

      Despite these vulnerabilities, South Africa has several mechanisms that reduce the likelihood of a coup:

1. Strong Constitutional Norms: The country's constitution is widely respected both domestically and internationally. Any attempt to dismantle it would face resistance from legal institutions, civil society, and external partners.

2. Regional and International Positioning: South Africa's leadership role within the African Union (AU), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) subjects it to significant international scrutiny. A coup would undermine Pretoria's influence on the continent and globally.

3. Civil Society and Media Vigilance: South Africa's robust media landscape and vocal civil society organizations act as deterrents to authoritarian regression.

4. Professional Military Tradition: The SANDF has not been politicized to the extent seen in coup-prone states, and its senior leadership consistently emphasizes loyalty to constitutional order.

Risk Assessment: Coup vs. Social Unrest

Although a traditional military coup is improbable in South Africa, the nation is confronted with a similarly grave threat in the form of widespread social unrest and the gradual erosion of state capabilities. The disturbances in July 2021, which quickly spread throughout KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, starkly illustrated the fragility of South Africa's social cohesion. Initially sparked by the incarceration of former president Jacob Zuma, the violence soon escalated independently, revealing deep-seated issues related to poverty, inequality, unemployment, and governance failures. Within a short period, the state found it challenging to manage the extensive looting, sabotage, and community conflicts, highlighting that unrest can destabilize a nation to a degree comparable to a coup, even without military involvement.

This underscores a broader reality concerning South Africa's security path. The genuine threat does not lie in the image of tanks advancing through Pretoria's streets, but in the recurring cycles of unrest that undermine the legitimacy of the democratic system. When vast numbers feel excluded from economic opportunities, when service delivery fails, and when corruption erodes trust in public institutions, unrest becomes a regular aspect of politics rather than an anomaly. Each episode leaves institutions weaker and citizens more disenchanted, perpetuating a vicious cycle of instability.

Over time, this situation can weaken the resilience of democracy just as effectively as a direct military takeover would. The peril of this trajectory is that it creates opportunities for political opportunists who thrive during crises. Populist leaders may portray themselves as defenders of the poor while simultaneously undermining democratic protections in the name of restoring order. Similarly, more authoritarian figures might claim that South Africa requires a "strong hand" to avert chaos, exploiting public dissatisfaction with ineffective governance. In such circumstances, democratic regression does not occur through a dramatic break but through gradual steps that diminish checks and balances, limit dissent, and weaken accountability.

The loss is slow but equally significant. South Africa's democratic framework offers crucial protections against these outcomes. Its constitution is among the most progressive globally, safeguarding fundamental rights and limiting the potential for authoritarian excesses. The military, despite its challenges, has largely maintained professionalism and political neutrality, avoiding the politicization that has often preceded coups in other parts of Africa.

Civil society organizations, the media, and the judiciary continue to serve as watchdogs, holding leaders accountable and exposing instances of power abuse. These institutions are essential, but their effectiveness relies on political leaders respecting their independence and ensuring they are adequately funded and supported.

It would be risky to be complacent in this situation. The same circumstances that have made coups and authoritarian shifts possible elsewhere on the continent are reflected in South Africa's vulnerability. Decision-making has frequently been stalled by political factionalism inside the ruling party, allowing pressing issues to worsen. Corruption scandals have undermined governance ability and damaged public trust, ranging from state capture to maladministration at the local level. Water shortages, power outages, and crumbling municipal infrastructure are examples of service delivery failures that add to the grievances of communities who already feel abandoned by the state. These elements work together to produce a volatile atmosphere where public ire can quickly flare.

Therefore, the upheaval in July 2021 should be viewed as a warning rather than an anomaly. The nation runs the risk of entering a vicious cycle where disturbance becomes accepted unless authorities address the systemic causes of discontent, which include poverty, unemployment, inequality, and corruption. Every repeat would erode democratic institutions' credibility and impair their capacity to resolve disputes and maintain stability. Even if a military takeover is unlikely in such a situation, democracy could gradually deteriorate.

The claim made by Minister Ntshavheni that a coup is not imminent in South Africa is accurate. Navigating a distinct, more pernicious type of democratic fragility, however, is the real challenge. There is a greater chance of institutions gradually being undermined by unsolved systemic difficulties than of generals hatching schemes in barracks. In addition to relying on institutional legacies and constitutional protections, South Africa must address the underlying causes of instability with clarity and urgency if it is to preserve its democracy. In the absence of this, the nation may find itself veering toward a future in which democracy is nominally intact but fundamentally undermined, its legitimacy gradually eroded by persistent instability and unfulfilled societal aspirations.